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Qui Tam Relators, the First Amendment, and
the False Claims Act
Joshua Patrick Mahoneyt
INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 allows a private citizen to file
suit "for the person and for the United States government." 2 The
citizen sues to recover damages for "false or fraudulent claim[s]"
submitted to the government for payment.3 While the Attorney
General is also authorized to bring claims under the FCA, 4 pri-
vate citizen suits, also called "qui tam"5 suits, comprise a signifi-
cant majority of FCA claims filed.6 Qui tam suits account for the
largest portion of funds recovered under the FCA.7 To bring a qui
t BA 2009, University of Northern Iowa; JD Candidate 2013, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 31 USC §§ 3729-33.
2 31 USC § 3730(b)(1).
3 31 USC § 3729(a).
4 31 USC § 3730(a).
5 "Qui tam" stems from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur." It translates as follows: "Who as well for the king as for himself
sues in this matter." Black's Law Dictionary 1368 (West 9th ed 2009).
6 In 2010, qui tam actions comprised more than 80 percent of total claims filed under
the FCA. See American Civil Liberties Union v Holder, 673 F3d 245, 251 n 4 (4th Cir
2011).
7 For a summary of the amounts recovered under the FCA, see Department of Jus-
tice, Fraud Statistics-Overview (Dec 2011), online at http://www.justice.gov/civil
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tam suit, a private citizen-called a "relator"-first provides a
copy of the complaint and "substantially all material evidence
and information the person possesses" to the government.8 The
complaint must then be filed in camera in federal court and
placed "under seal for at least 60 days."9 The seal provision may
be extended for "good cause."o In practice, a qui tam FCA com-
plaint typically remains under seal for an estimated thirteen
months." As of January 2011, there were more than 1,300 FCA
qui tam complaints under seal.12
In American Civil Liberties Union v Holder,13 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the FCA sealing requirement violates
the First Amendment's "right of access" doctrine, which permits
the public to access judicial proceedings.14 The Fourth Circuit
held that the seal passed constitutional muster because the pro-
vision was "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling government
interest."15 The court determined that "the complex nature of
modern fraud investigations, the government's limited resources,
and the unique nature of a qui tam action under the FCA" were
compelling interests that outweighed the public's right to access
the FCA complaint.' 6
/docsjforms/C-FRAUDSFCAStatistics.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012). Qui tam actions have
helped the government recover more than $18 billion in government money over the past
23 years. See American Civil Liberties Union v Holder, 673 F3d at 259 (citations omitted).
8 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
9 31 USC § 3703(b)(2).
10 31 USC § 3730(b)(3).
11 See Brief for Appellants, American Civil Liberties Union v Holder, Civil Action No
09-2086, '10-11 (4th Cir filed Nov 9, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 3754061)
("ACLU Brief). The ACLU Brief states:
According to DOJ, as of July 2007, there were approximately 1,000 qui tam cas-
es that were under seal pending the government's decision whether to inter-
vene. The average length of time between the filing of an FCA case and the gov-
ernment's intervention notification is approximately 13 months. FCA cases,
however, are usually sealed for much longer: typically for two to three years,
and for as long as nine.
Id.
12 See Jim Esquea and Ronald Weich, Letter to Senator Charles E. Grassley *13 (Jan
24, 2011), online at http://quitam-lawyer.com/sites/quitam-lawyer.com/files/DOJ-HHS-
joint-letter-to-Grassley.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) (noting that, as of January 2011, 1,341
qui tam cases had Department of Justice intervention decisions pending).
13 673 F3d 245 (4th Cir 2011) ("ACLU v Holder").
14 Id at 247. ACLU v Holder is the first case to consider whether the FCA sealing
provision violates the First Amendment.
15 Id at 253.
16 Id.
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This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit in ACLU v
Holder failed to consider the implications of two important ante-
cedent questions in its disposition of the First Amendment chal-
lenge. First, what is the functional relationship between a qui
tam relator and the government? And second, how does the rela-
tor-government relationship affect the First Amendment analy-
sis of the sealing provision? Unlike both the majority and the
dissenting opinions in ACLU v Holder, this Comment argues
that the "right of access" doctrine was not the correct First
Amendment test to apply to the seal provision. Instead, the court
should have more fully considered the implications of Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v Stevens.17 In Vermont Agency, the
Court accepted a partial assignment theory for the relator vis-A-
vis the government.18 Under a partial assignment theory, the
relator is not simply an ordinary citizen, but instead is a quasi-
government employee-or at least an independent contractor-
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. Thus, the court in
ACLU v Holder should have used the First Amendment's public
employment doctrine (and more specifically, the independent
contractor line of cases within the public employment doctrine)' 9
to determine whether the seal provision violates First Amend-
ment protections. The argument this Comment advances, then,
is syllogistic: because qui tam relators are de facto government
employees-or, at least, independent contractors-and because
the public employment doctrine allows the government to place
certain restrictions on government employee and contractor
speech that the government may not restrict for private citizens,
the sealing provision is constitutional.
Notably, the outcome of ACLU v Holder is likely the same
under either line of analysis (right of access or public employ-
ment). But using the public employment doctrine more closely
depicts the true nature of the relationship between the qui tam
relator and the government. Correctly framing this unique rela-
tionship will lead to a better theorized understanding of the
FCA's qui tam provisions and similar qui tam provisions estab-
lished elsewhere in the United States Code. 20 It will also shift
17 529 US 765 (2000) ("Vermont Agency").
18 Id at 773-74.
19 See Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US 563 (1968). See also Board of County
Commissioners v Umbehr, 518 US 668 (1996).
20 See, for example, 25 USC § 81 (creating a cause of action and monetary reward for
turning in persons who deal with Native Americans in an unlawful manner); 35 USC
§ 92(b) (establishing a cause of action against individuals who falsely market patent arti-
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any debate about the sealing provision away from the constitu-
tional adjudication arena and back to Congress. 21
Part I of this Comment explains the relevant background of
the FCA and focuses on the qui tam and seal provisions that
were challenged in ACLU v Holder. Part II discusses the First
Amendment "right of access" doctrine. Part III assesses the func-
tional nature of a qui tam relator's interest in an FCA action in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Agency. Part IV
analyzes the sealing provision through the lens of the public em-
ployment doctrine as an independent rationale for the seal's con-
stitutionality. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FCA
This Part first provides a brief historical overview of the
FCA and discusses its primary purposes. Next, the Part discuss-
es the history of the sealing provision and highlights the Senate
Report accompanying the sealing amendment to explore its in-
tended design. The Part then discusses Vermont Agency and its
possible utility for defining the contours of the legal relationship
between a relator and the government. The Part concludes by
discussing the relator-government relationship from the perspec-
tive of established contract theory.
A. Background
The FCA was passed during the Civil War to combat perva-
sive and widespread fraud in Civil War defense contracts. 22
While initially used to police illegal war profiteering, the FCA
has become a critical component of the government's antifraud
strategy.23 The FCA enables either a private citizen or the Attor-
ney General to file suit against anyone who submits a false claim
for payment to the government.24 If a private citizen, called a
"relator," brings a claim, the claim must be served only on the
government, along with a written disclosure of "substantially all"
cles).
21 For an article that discusses the difficulty in using First Amendment analysis to
vindicate individual rights, see generally John Q. Mulligan, Note, Huppert, Reilly, and
the Increasing Futility of Relying on the First Amendment to Protect Employee Speech, 19
Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 449, 456-57 (2010).
22 False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 7
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266.
23 See ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 258-59 (Gregory dissenting).
24 31 USC § 3730(a)-(b).
[ 2012302
299] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FCA SEALING PROVISION 303
the relator's underlying evidence for the claim.2 5 The government
then has at least sixty days to decide whether to intervene in the
action. 26 During this time, defendants have no notice that a
cause of action has been filed. Indeed, defendants are not ap-
prised of the suit until a court affirmatively orders the relator or
government to do so. 2 7 Importantly, the relator must refrain from
speaking about the underlying complaint during the seal peri-
od.28 If the relator discloses the existence of the complaint, the
complaint may be dismissed with prejudice. 29
If the government participates in a relator's suit, it has the
primary responsibility to prosecute the action. 30 The relator,
though, may continue to participate in the proceedings and may
receive up to 25 percent of the amount recovered. 31 If the gov-
ernment declines to intervene, the relator still has the option to
pursue the claim and recover up to 30 percent of the damages. 32
If the government decides to join a relator's suit later in the liti-
gation, it may do so only upon a showing of "good cause."33 Final-
ly, the government may dismiss the case entirely so long as the
relator is allowed a chance to object before the court.34
B. The 1986 Amendments to the FCA and the Mandatory Seal-
ing Provision
Significantly, before 1986, there was no mandatory sealing
provision in the FCA.3 5 The sealing provision was added in 1986
to address the Department of Justice's concerns that qui tam
complaints filed in open court may alert defendants to ongoing
25 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See, for example, Summers v LHC Group, Inc, 623 F3d 287, 298-99 (6th Cir 2010)
(affirming dismissal of a qui tam suit because the relator revealed the existence of the
complaint to the public).
29 While some courts have held that disclosing the existence of a complaint vitiates
the court's jurisdiction over the case, other courts have dismissed the complaint without
relying on a jurisdictional rationale. Compare id at 296 (holding that "violations of the
procedural requirements imposed on qui tam plaintiffs under the False Claims Act pre-
clude such plaintiffs from asserting qui tam status"), with Lujan v Hughes Aircraft Co, 67
F3d 242, 246 (9th Cir 1995) (developing a three-part test for whether or not violating the
seal provision warrants dismissal of the action with prejudice).
30 31 USC § 3730(c)(1).
31 31 USC § 3730(d)(1).
32 31 USC § 3730(d)(2).
33 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
3 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
3 See S Rep No 99-345 at 14 (cited in note 22).
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criminal investigations. 36 The Senate Judiciary Committee sub-
mitted a report accompanying the 1986 FCA amendments that
recognized the important governmental interests in protecting
its ongoing criminal investigations. The report explained:
[C]ourts [should] weigh carefully any extensions on the
period of time in which the Government has to decide
whether to intervene and take over the litigation. The
Committee feels that with the vast majority of cases, 60
days is an adequate amount of time to allow Government
coordination, review and decision. Consequently, "good
cause" would not be established merely upon a showing
that the Government was overburdened and had not had
a chance to address the complaint. While a pending crim-
inal investigation of the allegations contained in the qui
tam complaint will often establish "good cause" for stay-
ing the civil action, the Committee does not intend that
criminal investigations be considered an automatic bar to
proceeding with a civil fraud suit.
The Committee believes that if an initial stay is granted
based on the existence of a criminal investigation, the
court should carefully scrutinize any additional Govern-
ment requests for extensions by evaluating the Govern-
ment's progress with its criminal inquiry. The Govern-
ment should not, in any way, be allowed to unnecessarily
delay lifting of the seal from the civil complaint or pro-
cessing of the qui tam litigation.37
The legislative history thus contemplates that the sealing
requirement be closely connected to an ongoing criminal com-
plaint. In addition, the report explicitly renounced any attempt
to extend the sealing requirement simply because the govern-
ment is "overburdened."38 Yet while the record clearly indicates
that extensions should not be granted liberally, that has been the
norm for FCA litigation.39
36 Id at 24.
3 Id at 24-25.
38 Id at 25.
3 See Kimberly A. Lucia, United States v Baylor University Medical Center: Impact
of FRCP 15(c)(2) on the False Claims Act's Seal Provision, 42 UC Davis L Rev 255, 265-66
n 71 (2008) (collecting cases and commentaries that illustrate common practices with the
sealing provisions).
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1. Case law interpreting the seal provision of the FCA: adju-
dication if the complaint is not filed under seal.
In Pilon v Martin Marietta Corporation,40 the Second Circuit
reasoned that the failure to file the complaint under seal frus-
trated the legislative purposes of the sealing provision. 41 The
court also noted that other interests not laid out in the seal pro-
vision's legislative history weighed in favor of dismissal-
namely, protecting the defendant's reputational interest and de-
terring coercive settlement practices. 42 The court worried that
relators may violate the seal provision and go public with the
complaint to gain leverage in the litigation and coerce a more
lucrative offer from the defendant. 4 3 Other circuits have split on
the consequences of violating the seal provisions. 4 4
One way to think about the different approaches courts have
taken to relators who violate the seal provision is to analogize
these decisions to remedies for contractual breach.45 On this
view, the seal functions as part of the government's interest as
an employer: Uncle Sam has hired relators to help ferret out
fraud in the public fisc. But if the relators (or "contractors") do
not abide by the seal's (the "contract") terms, courts will not
jump in and mandate specific performance by the government. 4 6
2. Case law granting extensions to the sealing provision.
Courts have routinely allowed the government to extend the
time a complaint may be kept under seal, applying the "good
cause" standard in the statute liberally to approve extensions.
40 60 F3d 995 (2d Cir 1995).
1 Id at 999.
42 See Part ID for a discussion of why these opinions may be better understood if read
from a contract theory perspective. For instance, while not explicitly couching its reason-
ing in contract terms, it is at least arguable that the Second Circuit's discussion of per-
verse incentives and moral hazards maps nicely onto the notion of "good faith" in carrying
out obligations of contracts. Accord Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) ("Eve-
ry contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its perfor-
mance and its enforcement.").
43 Pilon, 60 F3d at 999.
44 Compare Lujan, 67 F3d at 246 (developing a three-part test for deciding whether
to dismiss a relator's complaint after violating the seal provision), with Summers, 623
F3d at 296 (requiring automatic dismissal if the relator discloses the existence of the
complaint). See also Bogart v King Pharmaceuticals, 414 F Supp 2d 540 (ED Pa 2006)
(not requiring automatic dismissal of the action if the seal provision is violated).
4 For a discussion of contract theory and its relation to the qui tam provisions, see
Part ID.
46 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 (discussing the availability of specific
performance for certain contractual breaches).
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Indeed, the average length of time an FCA complaint remains
under seal is thirteen months.4 7 When courts refuse to allow ex-
tensions, it is typically after the courts have already granted
numerous extensions to the initial sixty-day period.4 8 Aside from
the complaint, the government has attempted to seal other doc-
uments accompanying an FCA action. Notably, the FCA does not
contemplate whether the government's motions for extensions of
time and accompanying memoranda may remain under seal in
perpetuity.49 Courts have typically assessed whether to keep
these files under seal on a case-by-case basis. They rely on the
right of access presumption in favor of disclosure and generally
lift the seal to all documents once the government has decided
whether to intervene, absent a significant countervailing inter-
est.50
C. Vermont Agency's Endorsement of the Partial Assignment
Theory
In Vermont Agency, the Court held that the relator receives
a partial assignment of the government's interest in a damages
action against a defendant. 1 The partial assignment theory is
47 See note 11. But see Kalish v Desnick, 765 F Supp 1352, 1355-56 (ND Ill 1991)
(declining to extend the seal because the government could not demonstrate good cause
with sufficient specificity). See also Woods v North Arkansas Regional Medical Center,
2006 WL 2583662, *4 (WD Ark) (declining to allow more than three grants of extension).
4 See, for example, Costa v Baker & Taylor, Inc, 955 F Supp 1188, 1191-92 (ND Cal
1997) (declining to grant the government an additional extension of the sealing provision
after eighteen months); Dekort v Integrated Coast Guard Systems, 705 F Supp 2d 519, 529
n 2 (ND Tex 2010) (declining to extend the seal provision beyond twenty-eight months).
49 See Rostholder v Omnicare, Inc, 799 F Supp 2d 547, 548 (D Md 2011).
50 See, for example, id (declining to keep motions to extend the seal and accompany-
ing memoranda under seal); Yannacopolous v General Dynamics, 457 F Supp 2d 854, 858
(ND Ill 2006) (same); Coughlin v International Business Machines Corporation, 992 F
Supp 137, 141 (NDNY 1998) (unsealing memoranda accompanying opposition to a set-
tlement agreement because the documents requested did not "contain substantive details
regarding the government's methods of investigation" and refusing to acknowledge a
reputational interest as sufficient to warrant indefinite sealing). See also Health Out-
comes Technologies v Hallmark Health Systems, Inc, 349 F Supp 2d 170, 173 (D Mass
2004) ("Numerous courts have thus held that, by permitting in camera submissions, the
statute necessarily invests the court with authority either to maintain the filings under
seal or to make them available to the parties."). But see O'Keefe v McDonnell Douglas
Corp, 902 F Supp 189, 192 (ED Mo 1995) (declining to unseal motions and accompanying
memoranda for extensions of time because the documents provided "substantive details
regarding the government's methods of investigation").
51 529 US at 765-66 (reasoning that the FCA in effect creates a "partial assignment
of the government's damages claim").
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instructive for addressing the constitutional issues raised by the
mandatory seal provision in the FCA.5 2
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Vermont Agency,
described two separate governmental interests that are harmed
by virtue of the defendant's fraud: the harm inflicted on the gov-
ernment in its sovereign capacity to administer laws, and the
harm suffered by the government in its proprietary capacity be-
cause of theft from the public fisc. 53 Justice Scalia then charac-
terized the government as partially assigning a portion of its
proprietary interest in an FCA action to the relator. 54 In other
words, the qui tam provisions allow the government to assign its
interest in recovering the funds to the relator--even though the
relator (the assignee) has not, in a sense, suffered any cognizable
injury-in-fact.55
In Vermont Agency, Justice Scalia discussed the assignment
theory of the relator's interest for the purposes of Article III
standing analysis only.56 By adopting the assignment theory,
however, the Court raised new issues about the relator's position
vis-A-vis the government.57 For instance, it may be legally unsat-
isfactory to reason that the government's separate interests as a
sovereign and as a proprietor are severable.5 8 And the assign-
52 There is considerable academic literature on the qui tam relator's interest in an
FCA action. See, for example, Jonathan H. Gold, Note, Legal Duties That Qui Tam Rela-
tors and Their Counsel Owe to the Government, 20 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 629, 639
(2007); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century
Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 Admin L
Rev 859, 918 (2000); Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and
the Government: Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 Stan L Rev 1061, 1068-69
(1991); Nathan D. Sturycz, Comment, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest
Qui Tam Relators Represent and the Implications for Future False Claims Act Litigation,
28 SLU Pub L Rev 459, 468 (2009). See also George S. Mahaffey Jr, Taking Aim at the
Hydra: Why the "Allied-Party Doctrine" Should Not Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the
Government Declines to Intervene, 23 Rev Litig 629, 644 n 70 (2004) (collecting court
opinions on the subject).
53 See Vermont Agency, 529 US at 771 ("[The plaintiff] contends he is suing to remedy
injury in fact suffered by the United States-both the injury to its sovereignty arising
from violation of its laws and the proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.").
54 Id at 773.
55 Id at 772. See also 31 USC § 3730(b)(1) ("A person may bring a civil action for a
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States government.") (emphasis
added).
56 See Gold, Note, 20 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 639 (cited in note 52).
5 See, for example, id. See also Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act:
Criminal Punishment in Civil Disguise, 70 Def Couns J 472 (2003).
58 See Askanase, 70 Def Couns J at 477 (cited in note 57) (noting that it is incongru-
ous not to allow standing for assigned rights of the government as sovereign but to allow
relators to seek punitive damages designed to deter future conduct under the category of
proprietary interests).
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ment theory could be used to swallow all of Article III's standing
requirement, which restricts jurisdiction of federal courts to
"cases" or "controversies."69 While these arguments may have
merit, it is unclear how far courts would be willing to extend the
partial assignment theory in the context of standing beyond
Vermont Agency's rationale.
D. Nature of the Relator's Interest in an FCA Suit
The partial assignment theory solves many of the problems
associated with using common law agency or duty analyses to
understand the relator-government relationship. 60 It also pro-
vides a normatively attractive way to theorize the underlying
relationship between the relator and the government. Character-
izing the relationship between the relator and the government in
contract terms is more than an academic exercise: it has im-
portant practical implications for identifying what legal relation-
ships the FCA creates. Understanding the underlying legal rela-
tionships created by the FCA will produce more analytic coher-
ency in assessing statutory and constitutional issues inherent in
the FCA's qui tam provisions and may lead to a better under-
standing of the precise constitutional contours of qui tam provi-
sions in general.
At least one commentator has noted that Vermont Agency's
endorsement of the partial assignment theory is best understood
in contract terms:
[T]he FCA's qui tam provision is an enforceable unilateral
contract, the terms and conditions of which are accepted
by the relator upon filing the qui tam suit. Because as-
signment is a matter of contract, the unusual terms of the
FCA's assignment cannot affect its legal sufficiency.6'
Viewing the relator-government relationship through a con-
tract lens yields several important insights. For instance, the
relator and government can be said to have entered into a legally
enforceable bargain: in consideration for receiving a certain per-
centage of the bounty recovered from the defendant, the relator
5 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1. See also Thomas R. Lee, Note, The Standing of QuLi Tam
Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U Chi L Rev 543, 569 (1990).
60 See generally Gold, Note, 20 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 629 (cited in note 52);
Park, Note, 43 Stan L Rev at 1068-69 (cited in note 52).
61 Lee, Note, 57 U Chi L Rev at 564 (cited in note 59).
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agrees to refrain from speaking publicly about the complaint. 62 If
the relator breaches this agreement by revealing the existence of
the complaint, the government is no longer obligated to pay the
relator a portion of the recovery. 63 The terms of the contract are
important because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, for the
government to mandate that a private citizen who has not en-
tered into a contract with the government must refrain from
speaking about the filing of a civil action. 64
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: RIGHT OF ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE
In Globe Newspaper Co v Superior Court for County of Nor-
folk, 65 the Supreme Court held that the public has a First
Amendment right to access criminal trials.66 In the case, the
Massachusetts legislature had passed a law requiring trial judg-
es to exclude the "general public" from the courtroom during the
testimony of rape victims under the age of eighteen.67 The plain-
tiff, a newspaper, was denied access to a criminal trial involving
such testimony. The newspaper filed suit, claiming the First
Amendment allowed the press access to the courtroom during the
proceedings.68
The Supreme Court agreed with the newspaper, citing two
compelling reasons for striking down the Massachusetts statute.
First, the Court noted that criminal trials have historically been
62 And, arguably, from discussing the existence of the underlying fraud to the general
public while the complaint is under seal. See ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 262 (Gregory
dissenting) ("Without relying on the complaint, other documents and affidavits, or any
evidence contained therein, I am hard-pressed to see how any relator could still speak
about fraud without violating the seal provisions or being chilled."). See also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 3 ("A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to ex-
change a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.").
63 See, for example, Summers, 623 F3d at 290 (affirming dismissal of a qui tam suit
because the relator revealed the existence of the complaint to the public). There are a
significant number of cases that deal with violations of the breach of the sealing agree-
ment. While some circuits have developed a balancing test, see Lujan, 67 F3d at 246
(discussing the three-part test), others have held that revealing the existence of a sealed
complaint warrants per se dismissal of the action with prejudice. See Summers, 623 F3d
at 290. For this Comment, the important point is that courts typically bar recovery for
relators if they violate the requirements of the seal provision--or in contract terms,
breach the terms of their agreement with the government.
64 See US Const Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.") (emphasis added).
65 457 US 596 (1982).
66 Id at 602.
67 Id at 598.
68 Id at 600-01.
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open to the public, a social norm predating the Constitution.69
Second, public access to criminal trials "enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits
to both the defendant and to society as a whole." 0 These two
principles were subsequently characterized as the "experience
and logic" test in a later Supreme Court opinion.71
Finding that there is a right to attend criminal proceedings
under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Globe estab-
lished that a trial court may restrict access to judicial proceed-
ings only if such a restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling government interest.72 Applying that test to the facts in
Globe, the Court reasoned that while protecting the "physical
and psychological well-being of a minor" and incentivizing mi-
nors to testify qualify as compelling interests, they did not merit
a categorical denial of access to the judicial proceedings. 73 In-
stead, the Court opined that judges must determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the interests of underage rape victims out-
weigh the interest of the public in attending the trial. 74
While Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Globe attempted to
cabin the decision to criminal trials, 76 district and circuit court
decisions have extended the First Amendment right of access
standard to civil trials under Globe's reasoning as well. 76 Yet
69 Globe, 457 US at 605.
70 Id at 606.
71 See Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court, 478 US 1, 8-9 (1986). Justice Brennan's
"experience and logic" test, formulated in Globe, has been interpreted by lower federal
courts as either conjunctive or disjunctive. That is, courts have at times granted a right of
access only where both historical evidence suggests the place and proceedings have been
open to the public and logic suggests that openness will lead to positive externalities,
such as judicial transparency, for the proceedings at issue. For further discussion of the
"experience and logic" test, see Nicole J. Dulude, Note, Unlocking America's Courthouse
Doors: Restoring A Presumption of First Amendment Access as a Means of Reviving Public
Faith in the Judiciary, 11 Roger Williams U L Rev 193, 196 (2005).
72 Globe, 457 US at 606-07.
73 Id at 607-09.
74 Id at 608-09.
75 Id at 611 (O'Connor concurring) (reasoning that the Court's decision does not "car-
ry any implications outside the context of criminal trials").
76 See, for example, Rushford v New Yorker Magazine, Inc, 846 F2d 249, 253 (4th Cir
1988) (finding a First Amendment right of access to summary judgment motions filed in a
civil suit); In re Providence Journal Co, 293 F3d 1, 13 n 5 (1st Cir 2002) (recognizing the
First Amendment right of access in the context of criminal proceedings and applying the
rule to civil cases); Publicker Industries, Inc v Cohen, 733 F2d 1059, 1070 (3rd Cir 1984)
("Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, plays an important role in the
participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs. . . . [W]e hold that the First
Amendment embraces a right of access to [civil] trials.") (quotation marks omitted);
Westmoreland a Columbia Broadcast System, Inc, 752 F2d 16, 23 (2d Cir 1984). The court
in Westmoreland described the rationale underlying the application of the right of access
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whether the Supreme Court would apply the First Amendment
to civil complaints remains an open question.77 It seems unlikely,
however, that civil complaints are somehow exempt from First
Amendment analysis under the "experience and logic" test. In-
deed, as Judge Gregory noted in his dissent in ACLU v Holder,
"complaints, it goes almost without saying, have a foundational
function in civil trials."78 That foundational function speaks to
the benefits that inhere from having open records to fraudulent
investigations to improve transparency in government as a
whole.
III. RIGHT OF ACCESS APPLIED: ACLU VHOLDER
A. Majority Analysis
In ACLU v Holder, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the mandatory sealing requirement of the FCA violates the First
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings.79 The plain-
tiffs in the case sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming
that the mandatory sealing provisions violated the First
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. 0 The plain-
tiffs in the case were nonprofit entities that sought the right to
doctrine to civil trials as follows:
[Tihe First Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of ac-
cess to civil proceedings in accordance with the dicta of the Justices in Rich-
mond Newspapers, because public access to civil trials enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, fosters an appearance of
fairness, and heightens public respect for the judicial process, while permitting
the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an
essential component in our structure of self government.
Id (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virgin-
La, 448 US 555, 580 n 17 (1980) (Burger) (plurality) (noting that "historically both crimi-
nal and civil trials have been presumptively open"). But see In re Reporters Communica-
tion for Freedom of the Press, 773 F2d 1325, 1331-36 (DC Cir 1985) (refusing to extend
the First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings because the "history" prong of
logic and experience test had not been satisfactorily proven).
n See Debra T. Landis, Public access to records and proceedings of civil actions in
federal district courts, 96 ALR Fed 769, § 2 (2012) (noting that "there is no Supreme
Court case directly on point as to the extent of the right of access in Federal District
Court civil case to attend the proceedings . . . or to have access to the record of the pro-
ceedings").
7 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 260 (Gregory dissenting).
7 Id (majority). For the purposes of the appeal, the court assumed, without deciding,
that the First Amendment applied to the sealing provisions. See id at 252.
80 Id at 247. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the sealing provision was uncon-
stitutional because (1) it gagged qui tam relators from speaking about the allegations of
the complaint and (2) it violated separation of powers because it divested the court's au-
thority to determine on a case-by-base basis whether to seal a complaint. Id.
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both give and receive information about the FCA complaint itself
and the underlying fraud contained in the case.81
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court
has recognized that the First Amendment guarantees a right of
access to certain criminal trials and proceedings. 82 At the same
time, the court reasoned that the First Amendment right is "not
absolute" and that the Globe "experience and logic" test may be
overcome by showing that the government action both furthers a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.83
The court indicated that "protecting the integrity of ongoing
fraud investigations" was a sufficiently compelling government
interest, standing alone, for the government to interpose a man-
datory sealing provision in the FCA. 84 In addition, it cited the
legislative history of the sealing provision as providing additional
compelling justifications for the requirement.85
Next, the court listed three features of the sealing require-
ment that in its view made the sealing provision narrowly tai-
lored. First, the court reasoned that the FCA's "detailed process"
for filing a qui tam complaint, which includes the sixty-day peri-
od, accounts for the "complex nature of modern fraud investiga-
tions, the government's limited resources, and the unique nature
of a qui tam action under the FCA."86 Second, the court empha-
sized that courts can extend the sealing period only if the gov-
ernment demonstrates "good cause."87 The court analogized this
provision to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which allows
federal courts to determine whether to seal certain discovery re-
quests.88 Third, the court noted that the seal provisions only pre-
8' Because the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, it is unclear wheth-
er the plaintiffs sought to remedy any of the underlying fraud.
82 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 247.
83 Id.
8 Id at 253.
85 Id at 256, citing S Rep No 99-345 at 24-25 (cited in note 22) and Pilon, 60 F3d at
998-99 (listing the following justifications: (1) to permit the United States to determine
whether it already was investigating the fraud allegations (either criminally or civilly);
(2) to permit the United States to investigate the allegations to decide whether to inter-
vene; (3) to prevent an alleged fraudster from being tipped off about an investigation; and
(4) to protect the reputation of a defendant, in that the defendant is named in a fraud
action brought in the name of the United States, but the United States has not yet decid-
ed whether to intervene).
86 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 253.
87 Id at 254.
88 Id, citing FRCP 26(c) ("The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense.") (emphasis added).
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vented the relator from discussing the complaint, not from dis-
cussing the underlying fraud.89
Lastly, the court reasoned that even if the default rule was
that every complaint was filed publicly, courts would still find
that some complaints may be filed in camera due to their sensi-
tive nature.90 Therefore, the court declared, the counterfactual
rule proffered by the plaintiff defeated the facial challenge to the
statute. 91
B. Judge Gregory's Dissent
In ALCU v Holder, Judge Gregory first took issue with the
majority's right of access analysis. In particular, he challenged
the government's asserted interests in keeping the complaint
under seal as "generalized formulations" that should not be so
"readily accepted." 92 He then juxtaposed the government's as-
serted interests with the interests of the public. Specifically, he
highlighted the importance of public dialogue in connection with
fraud allegations, the need for transparency in FCA enforcement,
and the public's interest in compelling the government to make
the decision whether to intervene, even if such a decision is polit-
ically challenging. 93
Next, Judge Gregory turned to the narrowly tailored prong
of the Globe test. He criticized the majority for passively accept-
ing the government's argument that the sealing provision only
applied to the complaint. In reality, courts have typically con-
strued the seal provisions to apply more broadly "to other docu-
ments filed prior to the government's notice of intervention." 94 In
addition, Judge Gregory noted that it was difficult to agree with
the majority that the relator was not barred from speaking about
the underlying fraud without "violating the seal provisions or
89 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 254.
90 Id.
91 Id at 254. In addition, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the "gag"
claim for lack of standing. Specifically, the court could not find a "willing listener" with
sufficient interest that would be willing to listen to the relator but for the seal's provi-
sions. Id. For a discussion of the "willing interest" standing doctrine, which applies only
to First Amendment cases, see Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 756 (1976) (noting that if a willing speaker can be found,
"the protection afforded [by the First Amendment] is to the communication, to its source
and to its recipients").
92 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 261 (Gregory dissenting).
93 Id.
9 Id at 262, citing John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui tam Actions § 4-215
(Aspen 4th ed 2011) (citations omitted).
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being chilled."9 5 He explained that "[u]nder [the majority's] read-
ing of the statute, the government could threaten criminal prose-
cution against anyone who discusses even the basic facts of
fraud."9 6 In other words, the practical reach of the seal provision
cut away from the government's argument that the provision was
narrowly tailored.97
IV. FREE SPEECH AND THE FCA REDUX: THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE IS THE CORRECT WAY TO ASSESS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEAL PROVISION
ACLU v Holder demonstrates the problems associated with
assessing the seal provision through traditional "right of access"
doctrine. Judge Gregory was correct to criticize the majority for
passively relying on the government's generalized formulations
of its interests justifying the seal provision.98 Also, the majority's
acceptance of the purported distinction between discussing the
complaint (which the seal prohibits)99 and discussing the under-
lying fraud (which the statute ostensibly does not prohibit) 100 is
tenuous. As Judge Gregory noted:
Without relying on the complaint, other documents and
affidavits, or any evidence contained therein, I am hard-
pressed to see how any relator could still speak about
fraud without violating the seal provisions or being
chilled. Under this reading of the statute, the Government
could threaten criminal prosecution against anyone who
discusses even the basic facts of fraud, as Appellant alleg-
es happened when it disclosed fraud to a newspaper.101
That the court read the statute in this manner in order to
find it narrowly tailored may be consistent with the Supreme
Court's constitutional avoidance canon,102 but it is unconvincing
95 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 262 (Gregory dissenting).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 262 (Gregory dissenting).
9 See 31 USC § 3730(b)(2). See also, for illustration, Davis v Prince, 766 F Supp 2d
679, 682 (ED Va 2011) ("The sealing requirement is mandatory; failure to file a complaint
under seal requires dismissal of a qui tam complaint with prejudice.").
100 ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 256.
101 Id at 262 (Gregory dissenting).
102 Constitutional avoidance is a bedrock principle of statutory interpretation. See, for
example, United States v Jin Fuey Moy, 241 US 394, 401 (1916) ("A statute must be con-
strued, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional,
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when considered from a functional perspective.103 It hardly
seems appropriate to say the categorical seal in the FCA is nar-
rowly tailored to facilitate fraud enforcement. After all, in Globe,
the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to categori-
cally exclude citizens from hearing the testimony of underage
rape victims. If constitutionally shielding from the public the tes-
timony of rape victims requires case-by-case analysis, it seems
incongruous to allow categorical exclusion of the public from ju-
dicial proceedings relating to fraud complaints.
This Part assesses the seal provision for the purposes of
First Amendment analysis through the Vermont Agency partial
assignment theory paradigm. Under this theory, the relator has
entered into a contract with the federal government. This doctri-
nal approach has several advantages. First, it recognizes the
functional relationship between the relator and the government.
The fluid relationship suggests the Constitution is the wrong
place to look for more open governance under the FCA. Such de-
cisions about appropriate amounts of disclosure by government
contractors (or quasi-government employees) are best left to the
legislative process.
The issue in ACLU v Holder should not have been whether
the seal provision violates the right of access doctrine. Instead,
the issue should have been whether the relator-government con-
tractual relationship is sufficient to deem a relator as approach-
ing government employee status. Under traditional First
Amendment analysis, the government could not punish an ordi-
nary citizen for wanting to speak about the existence of a com-
plaint. But, if the qui tam contract does in fact remove the rela-
tor from ordinary First Amendment protection, the provision
does not likely transgress any First Amendment limitation on
accessing a sealed complaint.
A. Public Employment Jurisprudence
For the purpose of First Amendment public employment
analysis, the government's separate interests as a sovereign and
as an employer must be recognized.10 4 The First Amendment on-
but also grave doubts upon that score.").
103 See Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 San Diego L Rev 907 (2011).
104 See, for example, Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr, Note, Government Employee, Are You A
"Citizen'? Garcetti v. Ceballos and the "Citizenship" Prong to the Pickering/Connick
Protected Speech Test, 52 SLU L J 589, 590 (2008). Stafstrom explains:
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ly prohibits the government from abridging the speech of gov-
ernment employees that relates to matters of "public concern."105
Speech relates to a matter of "public concern" if it implicates the
government as a sovereign, and not as simply an employer.106 In
deciding what constitutes "public concern," the Court has "con-
sistently given greater deference to government predictions of
harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to pre-
dictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the
public at large."10 7 Examples include restrictions on the political
activity of government employees108 or disputes over government
policy between government officials and their subordinates.109
The salient point is that the Court allows deference to the
government in deciding what types of speech may harm its ca-
pacity to function as an employer, even if such interests are
somewhat enmeshed with the government's sovereign inter-
ests.110 Notwithstanding some overlap between employer and
The government, as a sovereign, cannot restrict the free speech rights of the cit-
izenry in the name of efficiency. However, the government, as employer, may be
able to confine the free speech rights of its employees in order to function effec-
tually. Although a government employee is best situated to comment on gov-
ernmental actions, such a limitation is justified by the need to reconcile the
rights of the government, as employer, to provide public services with the free
speech rights of the employee.
Id.
105 Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 668 (1994) (plurality). The Court explained:
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the em-
ployee's interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by
any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees.
Id (citations and quotation marks omitted).
106 See Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 146 (1983) ("When employee expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.").
107 Waters, 511 US at 673 (plurality).
108 See id, citing United Public Workers of America v Mitchell, 330 US 75, 98 (1947).
109 See Waters, 511 US at 673 (plurality), citing Connick, 461 US at 167 (Brennan
dissenting).
110 See Waters, 511 US at 673 (plurality) ("[W]e have given substantial weight to gov-
ernment employers' reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved
is on a matter of public concern, and even though when the government is acting as sov-
ereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential."). The
Court in Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410 (2006), further delineated the contours of the
public concern doctrine. Id at 424. The Court established a bright-light rule that govern-
ment employees are not "citizens" within the meaning of the First Amendment when they
act pursuant to official duties. Id. Taken together, the "public concern" and "citizen" in-
quiry are best understand as threshold inquiries courts will apply to determine whether
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sovereign interests, the government as an employer may limit
the expression of its employees to facilitate more efficient gov-
ernance.111
In Pickering a Board of Education,112 the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment limits the extent to which the
government can retaliate against employees who speak as citi-
zens on "issues of public importance." 113 In the case, a teacher
was fired for complaining to a local newspaper about the alloca-
tion of funds within the school district. 11 4 The teacher filed suit,
claiming that his First Amendment rights as a citizen to speak
freely were abridged by the school district.115 To address the
First Amendment issue, the Court developed a balancing test to
accommodate both the interests of the government as an employ-
er and the speech interests of the private citizen. As Justice Mar-
shall reasoned:
The theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless
of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected. ... At
the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has in-
terests as an employer in regulating the speech of its em-
ployees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a bal-
ance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees.116
As the balancing test recognizes, there is more at stake than
simply an employer-employee relationship. When the govern-
ment acts as an employer, it may not "restrict speech in which
society might be interested."1 17 But before considering how to
any form of First Amendment protections to government employee speech. See Stafstrom,
Note, 52 SLU LJ at 591 (cited in note 104).
Ill See Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US 563, 568 (1968).
112 391 US 563 (1968).
113 Id at 568.
114 Id at 574.
115 Id.
116 Pickering, 391 US at 568 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
117 Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 Case W Res L
Rev 375, 394 (2010).
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apply Pickering to the FCA seal provision, a further wrinkle in
the public employment doctrine must be discussed.
B. Extension of Pickering to Independent Contractors in
Umbehr
The Supreme Court extended the Pickering balancing test to
independent contractors in Board of County Commissioners v
Umbehr.s18 In Umbehr, an independent landfill servicer contrac-
tor spoke critically of the local government at Board meetings.119
He wrote letters and editorials in newspapers criticizing the
county's landfill rates and charges. 120 After the county declined
to renew the contractor's trash hauling contract, the contractor
filed a 42 USC § 1983 action against members of the board of
county commissioners.121 He alleged First Amendment violations
of his right to freedom of expression.122
The Court first noted the obvious similarities between gov-
ernment employees and contractors-namely, that the govern-
ment needs freedom to terminate relationships with both em-
ployees and contractors for "poor performance, to improve the
efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public,
and to prevent the appearance of corruption."123 At the same
time, the Court noted that independent contractors may be
chilled in their First Amendment rights from the threat of retali-
ation.124 The Court found this troubling because government em-
ployees (and by extension, independent contractors) "are often in
the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work." 25
The Court ultimately sided with the contractor, holding that
the Pickering balancing test for government employees extends
to independent contractors as well.126 In achieving the balance,
the Court noted that the government's interest in achieving its
objectives is significantly elevated when it acts as an employer as
compared to when it acts as a sovereign.127
118 518 US 668 (1996).
119 Id at 671.
120 Id.
121 Id at 668.
122 Umbehr, 518 US at 668.
123 Id at 674.
124 Id.
125 Id, citing Waters, 511 US at 674 (plurality).
126 Umbehr, 518 US at 676.
127 Id.
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However, the Court separated independent contractors from
government employees by placing them between ordinary citi-
zens and full-fledged civil servants on a sort of governmental-
relationship continuum. 28 The government's interests, according
to the Court, may be somewhat "attenuated" when dealing with
independent contractors because, "where the contractor does not
work at the government's workplace and does not interact daily
with government officers and employees ... any government
concern that his political statements will be confused with the
government's political positions is mitigated."129 The application
of the Umbehr principle, therefore, seems to require a contextual
inquiry into the precise relationship between the contractor and
the government in any individual case.
C. Relators Should Be Considered Independent Contractors
The balancing test in Pickering and its extension in Umbehr
is the best fit for considering whether the seal provision abridges
a relator's First Amendment interests. That being said, it is over-
ly formalistic to classify the relator as a citizen who is being
''gagged" from speaking about the complaint or the underlying
fraud. The relator has filed the complaint in this manner, after
all, because, among other reasons, she wants the opportunity to
obtain a potentially lucrative recovery. While the government
may not place unconstitutional conditions on the receipt of gov-
ernment funds for ordinary citizens, the government may restrict
employee or contractor speech if doing so protects the interests of
the government qua employer. From this vantage point, the as-
serted employer interests favor restricting a relator's speech. 13 0
Otherwise, the FCA would lose its efficacy as the primary tool to
combat fraud against the government.
A recent law review article has demonstrated that the gov-
ernment has used the sealing time period to "outsource" its in-
vestigatory duties to plaintiffs attorneys. 131 Setting aside the due
process concerns that this practice implicates,132 the reality of
128 Id at 680.
129 Id at 677.
130 See ACLU v Holder, 673 F3d at 252.
131 Robert Fabrikant and Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims
Act: "Outsourcing" the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During
the Seal Period, 83 ND L Rev 837, 838, 843 (2007).
132 See, for example, Laura Hough, Note, Finding Equilibrium: Exploring Due Process
Violations in the Whistleblower Provisions of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, 19 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 1061, 1081 (2011).
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"outsourcing" is that the government is not using the sealing pe-
riod for the reasons envisioned by Congress when it added the
requirement in 1986.133 But, when viewed through the public
employment doctrine of the First Amendment, the plaintiff's at-
torneys' work only makes more pronounced the conclusion that
relators are not citizens at all, but hired hands of the govern-
ment. And if they are indeed contractors in a functional sense,
then the restrictions on the sealing provision do not offend the
First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
ACLU v Holder is the first case to consider whether the seal
provision of the FCA violates the First Amendment. However,
the court selected the right of access paradigm to assess the
seal's constitutionality. This decision was unfortunate. The right
of access doctrine assures the general citizenry a right of access
to judicial proceedings. As Judge Gregory in his dissent pointed
out, the right of access doctrine does not easily sanction the seal's
blanket constitutionality. Indeed, the majority's analysis relies
heavily on a bit of neoformalism-that is, eschewing an unconsti-
tutional holding by distinguishing between discussing the com-
plaint and the underlying fraud-when in practice such distinc-
tion is likely illusory.134
That is not to say that the majority ultimately reached a le-
gally incorrect result. Instead, this Comment has argued that the
majority lost an important opportunity to expound more clearly
on the Supreme Court's acceptance in Vermont Agency of the
partial assignment theory of the relator in an FCA action. Under
Vermont Agency principles, the relator is something more than
an ordinary citizen for First Amendment analysis, and yet some-
thing less than a full-fledged government employee. The implica-
tion is that the relator accepts a certain amount of abridgment of
'33 See Keith D. Barber, et al, Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Develop-
ments in False Claims Act Litigation, 1 Ind Health L Rev 131, 151-52 (2004). The authors
argue:
The seal provision, as described by Congress and in the legislative history, has a
legitimate government purpose. The practical use of the seal, however, has in
many cases crossed the line that separates legitimate from illegitimate purpos-
es. By using the seal in a manner contrary to law, the government erodes the
legitimacy of the seal itself.
Id.
134 See note 103.
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speech in exchange for a potentially lucrative payout. Such a
scheme does not offend the Constitution, and indeed, leads to
more effective governance. And by correctly theorizing the rela-
tor-government relationship, courts can leave to the legislative
process the delicate process of balancing constitutional interests
and efficient business practices-even when the business prac-
tices are carried out by the federal government.
:IE
